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CAN AIRLINE DEREGULATION WORK
IN INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORTATION?
I AM PLEASED TO BE ABLE TO JOIN YOU TODAY TO TALK ABOUT
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MORE COMPETITIVE INTERNATIONAL AIR
TRANSPORT SYSTEM -- A TOPIC THAT HAS GENERATED SUBSTANTIAL
DEBATE WORLDWIDE OVER THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS- IN THE COURSE
OF THIS INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUE, THE UNITED STATES WHICH HAS
ACTIVELY PROMOTED MORE COMPETITION, HAS BEEN ACCUSED NOT ONLY
OF A VARIETY OF HEINOUS DIPLOMATIC CRIMES BUT ALSO OF TRYING
TO SUBVERT THE CONTINUING DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
AIR TRANSPORT SYSTEM-
IN MY PRESENTATION I WILL FIRST ADDRESS THE SPECIFIC
CHARGES THAT HAVE BEEN MADE AGAINST THE UNITED STATES AND
THEN DISCUSS MORE BROADLY THE REASONS WHY THE UNITED STATES
FAVORS A MORE COMPETITIVE REGIME.
BACKGROUND
THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION CONFERENCE OF 1944
COMMONLY REFERRED TO AS THE CHICAGO CONFERENCE WAS A SEMINAL
EVENT IN THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL AVIATION AND RESULTED IN
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON MANY ASPECTS OF CIVIL AIRCRAFT
OPERATION. BUT NO MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED ON
THE KEY QUESTION OF HOW COMMERCIAL AIRLINES SHOULD BE PERMITTED
TO COMPETE. SEVERAL COUNTRIES, INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES,
ADVOCATED A VIRTUAL OPEN SKIES REGIME- OTHER IMPORTANT
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AVIATION POWERS LIKE THE UNITED KINGDOM ARGUED FOR MUCH
MORE RESTRICTIVE ARRANGEMENTS- AS A RESULT, THE EXCHANGE
OF OPERATING RIGHTS BETWEEN NATIONS WAS LEFT TO BE
RESOLVED THROUGH BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS. THE BERMUDA I
AGREEMENT NEGOTIATED BY THE U-S- AND THE U.K. IN 1946
BECAME THE MODEL FOR ALL THE U-S. AVIATION AGREEMENTS
OVER THE LAST 30 YEARS-
IN BERMUDA I, THE UNITED STATES ACCEPTED A MUCH MORE
RESTRICTIVE ARRANGEMENT THAN THE ONE IT ADVOCATED AT CHICAGO.
IT AGREED TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SPECIFIC ROUTES, AND
ACQUIESCED IN INTERCARRIER PRICE FIXING THROUGH THE RECENTLY
CREATED IATA SUBJECT TO GOVERNMENT REVIEW. THE BRITISH
GAVE UP THEIR DESIRE FOR PREDETERMINED CAPACITY. ALTHOUGH
BERMUDA I LEFT THE RIGHT TO DESIGNATE A NUMBER OF CARRIERS
IN ANY PARTICULAR ROUTE OPEN, THE U-S- CIVIL AERONAUTICS
BOARD UNTIL QUITE RECENTLY APPLIED ITS OWN GENERALLY RESTRICTIVE
ENTRY POLICY AND NEVER DESIGNATED MORE THAN TWO U.S- CARRIERS
ON ANY INTERNATIONAL ROUTE.
OVER THE YEARS, REGULATORY DECISIONS BY MOST GOVERNMENTS
ON INTERNATIONAL ROUTES TENDED TO PROTECT THE MARKET SHARES
OF INCUMBENT CARRIERS AND INTERNATIONAL RATES WERE ESTABLISHED
BY IATA AT LEVELS HIGH ENOUGH TO ASSURE A REASONABLE RETURN TO
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VIRTUALLY THE LEAST EFFICIENT CARRIER- By 1970 INTERNATIONAL AIR
TRANSPORTATION OPENLY FUNCTIONED AS A GOVERNMENTALLY SANCTIONED
CARTEL. THROUGH MUCH OF THE 1970's, A NUMBER OF IATA CARRIERS
ARGUED THAT THE ORGANIZATION'S PERVASIVE CONTROL OF AIR RATES
WAS DETRIMENTAL TO THE INDUSTRY AND THE PUBLIC- INDEED, THE
ONLY COMPETITIVE PRESSURE IN THE MARKET AT ALL UNTIL 1977 WAS
EXERTED BY A SMALL CADRE OF CHARTER CARRIERS WHICH MANAGED
TO OPERATE OUTSIDE THE BILATERAL FRAMEWORK DESPITE THEIR
BEING SUBJECT TO NUMEROUS OPERATING RESTRICTIONS BY THE AVIATION
AUTHORITIES OF- MOST GOVERNMENTS-
RESTRICTED ENTRY AND PRICING POLICIES WHILE DOING NOTHING
FOR CONSUMERS GENERALLY, HAVE ALSO FAILED TO PROVIDE SUBSTANTIAL
BENEFIT FOR THE INDUSTRY. INDUSTRY PROFITS HAVE BEEN EXTREMELY
CYCLICAL AND NEVER VERY HIGH. FOR EXAMPLE, THE EARLY 1970's
WAS A DISASTROUS PERIOD FOR AVIATION. THE REASONS FOR THIS
TERRIBLE PERFORMANCE APPEARED TO BE THREEFOLD. FIRST, THE
INDUSTRY'S MOVE TO ACQUIRE WIDEBODIED AIRCRAFT BASED ON
UNREALISTIC TRAFFIC FORECASTS. THE LACK OF PRICE COMPETITION
COMPELLED CARRIERS TO COMPETE ONLY ON SERVICE QUALITY. THIS
FORCED ALL MEMBERS OF THE CARTEL TO PURCHASE NEW EQUIPMENT
AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME THUS FOSTERING THIS OVERINVESTMENT.
SECOND, THE UNEXPECTED AND SHARP RISE IN FUEL COSTS BROUGHT
ABOUT BY OPEC NECESSITATED PRICE INCREASES WHICH FURTHER
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DEPRESSED TRAFFIC. FINALLY, THE WORST WORLDWIDE RECESSION
SINCE THE 1930's.
MOST COUNTRIES AND AIRLINES DID NOT SEE THE FINANCIAL
CRISIS OF THE EARLY 1970'S AS A PRODUCT OF THOSE UNIQUE
CIRCUMSTANCES COUPLED WITH THE REGULATORY INDUCED OVERIN-
VESTMENT BUT RATHER BELIEVED IT TO BE THE PRODUCT OF TOO
MUCH COMPETITION- UNFORTUNATELY, MANY BILATERAL AGREEMENTS
WERE COMING UP FOR RENEWAL IN 1976 AND THERE WAS A CLEAR
CONSENSUS AMONG FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS TO SEEK MORE RESTRICTIVE
AGREEMENTS WITH THE UNITED STATES, IN THE BELIEF THAT
ADDITIONAL CONTROLS WOULD PREVENT ANOTHER FINANCIAL CRISIS
DESPITE THE HISTORIC EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY-
THE FIRST MAJOR NEGOTIATIONS WERE WITH THE UNITED
KINGDOM. THE U-S. NEGOTIATORS WERE UNDER GREAT PRESSURE
TO ACCEPT AN AGREEMENT SUBSTANTIALLY MORE RESTRICTIVE THAN
BERMUDA I. WITHOUT A CLEAR SET OF CONSUMER ORIENTED GOALS AND
AN OVERALL NEGOTIATING STRATEGY, THE U-S- PLAYED A NUMBERS GAME
TO DIVIDE UP THE MARKETS BETWEEN ITS FLAG CARRIERS AND THE U.K.
FLAG CARRIERS- THE BERMUDA II AGREEMENT WAS A COMPETITIVE
DISASTER WHICH AMONG OTHER THINGS IMPOSED RESTRICTIONS ON THE
NUMBER OF CARRIERS THE U-S- COULD DESIGNATE IN U.K. MARKETS
AND ESTABLISHED A MECHANISM THAT ALLOWED THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT
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TO CONTROL INCREASES IN FREQUENCY (AND THUS CAPACITY) ON THE
NORTH ATLANTIC-
IT SOON BECAME CLEAR TO THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
THAT UNLESS A NEW APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS WAS IMPLEMENTED
QUICKLY, BERMUDA II WITH ITS NUMEROUS ANTICOMPETITIVE
FEATURES WOULD BECOME THE MODEL FOR FUTURE AGREEMENTS-
THE UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT POLICY
THE STARTING POINT FOR THE UNITED STATES IN THE SEARCH
FOR A NEW POLICY WAS A COMMITMENT TO CREATING A MORE EFFICIENT
SYSTEM LEADING TO GREATER SERVICE AND PRICE OPTIONS FOR
TRAVELERS AND SHIPPERS -- A RETURN TO THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUAL
COMPETITIVE OPPORTUNITIES WHICH WE FIRST PROPOSED AT CHICAGO
AND THAT BILATERAL AGREEMENTS SHOULD BE DESIGNED TO CREATE A
MARKET ENVIRONMENT WHERE COMPETITION CAN FLOURISH- IN DEALING
WITH DOMESTIC AIR TRANSPORTATION, THE BOARD, THE CONGRESS AND
THE PRESIDENT ALL VIEWED MORE COMPETITION AS THE VEHICLE FOR
ACHIEVING THESE GOALS. As IS APPARENT FROM THE POLICY STATEMENT
OF OUR DOMESTIC AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT OF 1978, WE HAVE
GENERALLY RECOGNIZED THAT THE INDUSTRY IS POTENTIALLY HIGHLY
COMPETITIVE BECAUSE AIRCRAFT ARE A MOBILE CAPITAL ASSET WHICH
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CAN BE READILY MOVED FROM ONE MARKET TO ANOTHER- MOREOVER,
WHILE ROUTE NETWORKS AND ECONOMIES OF SCALE MAY BE IMPORTANT
FOR SOME KINDS OF SERVICES, THEY ARE NOT CRITICAL IN ESTAB-
LISHING NEW POINT-TO-POINT SERVICE IN A PARTICULAR CITY-PAIR
MARKET-
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES FORMALLY ANNOUNCED
A PRO-COMPETITIVE POLICY ON AUGUST 21, 1978. THE PRINCIPLES
CONTAINED IN THIS STATEMENT WERE SUBSEQUENTLY ADOPTED BY
CONGRESS IN THE INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORTATION COMPETITION
ACT OF 1979. SINCE 1978, WE HAVE NEGOTIATED MORE OPEN
AGREEMENTS WITH THE NETHERLANDS, BELGIUM, LUXEMBOURG, GERMANY,
KOREA, SINGAPORE, JAMAICA, JORDAN AND ISRAEL; AND SIGNS ARE
GOOD FOR LIBERAL AGREEMENTS WITH SEVERAL OTHER COUNTRIES.
IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE NEGOTIATIONS OF LIBERAL BILATERALS,
THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD INITIATED IN JUNE, 1978 A REVIEW
OF OUR POLICY OF SANCTIONING INTERCARRIER RATE SETTING BY IATA.
THE BOARD COMPLETED ITS REVIEW IN APRIL, 1980 AND GENERALLY
CONTINUED APPROVAL OF THE RATE SETTING MECHANISM FOR AN
ADDITIONAL TWO YEARS. OVER THE NEXT TWO YEARS, THE BOARD
INTENDS TO CONSIDER FURTHER THE NEED FOR INTERCARRIER
AGREEMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL AIR FARES AFFECTING TRAVEL TO AND
FROM THE UNITED STATES. THE BOARD'S DECISION PROHIBITS
mmmmwww
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U- S- CARRIER PARTICIPATION IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC
CONFERENCE WHERE THE RATE SETTING MECHANISM HAS NOT
FUNCTIONED FOR SEVERAL YEARS BECAUSE OF THE HIGHLY COM-
PETITIVE NATURE OF THIS MARKET-
THE BOARD'S REVIEW OF THE IATA TARIFF MECHANISM
GENERATED MORE CRITICISM THAN ANY OTHER ASPECT OF OUR
INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM- YET, OUR ACTIONS SEEMED TO PROMPT
SOME OF THE REFORMS THAT SOME MEMBER CARRIERS HAD BEEN
ARGUING FOR WITH IATA OVER THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS. To
SOME EXTENT, OUR ACTION CAUSED ATTENTION TO SHIFT TO THE
UNITED STATES AND AWAY FROM MANY OF THE REAL ECONOMIC ISSUES
THAT FACED THE MEMBER CARRIERS. TODAY, THE U-S- IN CONJUNCTION
WITH A NUMBER OF OTHER COUNTRIES IS TRYING TO REFOCUS THE
ATTENTION OF GOVERNMENTS AND AIRLINES TO THE REAL AND CRITICAL
ISSUES CONFRONTING THE WORLD AVIATION COMMUNITY-
THE SIX MYTHS ABOUT A COMPETITIVE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
THE NEW UNITED STATES POLICIES HAVE CAUSED SUBSTANTIAL
CONTROVERSY- MANY GOVERNMENTALLY OWNED AIRLINES AND SOME
GOVERNMENTS HAVE GONE TO GREAT LENGTHS TO CRITICIZE AND
RIDICULE OUR POLICIES- As I WILL NOW DISCUSS, LITTLE
OF WHAT THEY CONTEND CAN WITHSTAND CLOSE SCRUTINY- I HAVE
PARAPHRASED THEIR ARGUMENTS INTO SIX MYTHS. EACH OF THESE
MYTHS WILL BE ADDRESSED IN SOME DETAIL-
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1. THAT THE UNITED STATES IS ATTEMPTING TO FOIST ITS
APPROACH ON OTHER NATIONS WHICH MAY HAVE DIFFERENT NATIONAL
GOALS AND IS IGNORING BASIC PRINCIPLES OF SOVEREIGNTY AND
COMITY;
2. THAT DEREGULATION QUICKLY WILL LEAD TO THE LOSS
OF THE REGULAR HIGH-FREQUENCY SERVICE THAT IS REQUIRED BY THE
WORLD BUSINESS COMMUNITY;
3. THAT OPEN COMPETITION IS INCONSISTENT WITH SOUND
ENERGY POLICY WHICH MAY REQUIRE SEVERE RESTRICTIONS IN LEISURE
TRAVEL TO ASSURE MAINTAINING SERVICE FOR BUSINESS TRAVELERS;
4. THAT COMPETITION MAY LOOK GOOD DURING THE BOOM IN THE
BUSINESS CYCLE BUT HISTORY HAS SHOWN THAT EXCESSIVE DISCOUNT
PRICING DURING GROWTH PERIODS HAS LED TO OVER-CAPACITY AND
FINANCIAL DISASTER DURING THE DOWNTURNS;
5. THAT CAREFUL REGULATION AND CAPACITY CONTROL CAN
ACHIEVE LOWER FARES THAN CAN OPEN ENTRY AND COMPETITION;
6. THAT IT IS FOOLISH TO TALK ABOUT OPEN SKIES WHEN THE
INDUSTRY IS SO DEPENDENT ON EXTERNAL CONSTRAINTS SUCH AS
LIMITED AIRPORT CAPACITY, AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL, TOURIST
ORGANIZATIONS, ETC-
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FIRST MYTH: "THAT THE UNITED STATES IS ATTEMPTING TO FOIST
ITS APPROACH ON OTHER NATIONS WHICH MAY HAVE DIFFERENT
NATIONAL GOALS AND IS IGNORING BASIC PRINCIPLES OF
SOVEREIGNTY AND COMITY."
SINCE NO MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED AT
CHICAGO ON THE EXCHANGE OF OPERATING RIGHTS, THE TASK OF
ESTABLISHING THESE RELATIONSHIPS THEN, AS IT IS TODAY, WAS
LEFT TO BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENTS-
WE ARE MORE THAN A LITTLE CONFUSED BY THE CONTENTION THAT IT
IS WRONG -- PRESUMABLY IN SOME MORAL SENSE -- TO NEGOTIATE
A LIBERAL BILATERAL WITH BELGIUM OR KOREA WITHOUT ALSO CON-
SULTING WITH FRANCE OR JAPAN. To IMPLY THAT TWO COUNTRIES
CANNOT FREELY AGREE TO EXCHANGE COMPETITIVE OPPORTUNITIES
RATHER THAN RESTRICTIONS WITHOUT SECURING THE APPROVAL OF THIRD
COUNTRIES JUST DOES NOT COMPORT WITH BASIC PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY-
WE EMPHASIZE THE EXPRESSION "FREELY AGREE," BECAUSE THERE
IS A COMMON MYTH THAT NO GOVERNMENT WOULD ENTER INTO A LIBERAL
AGREEMENT IF IT WERE NOT SUBJECT TO, IF NOT OUTRIGHT ECONOMIC
THREATS, THEN AT LEAST SUBSTANTIAL INTIMIDATION BY THE U.S.
NEGOTIATING TEAM. THIS VIEW IS MORE WISHFUL THINKING THAN A
REFLECTION OF REALITY -- THE UNITED STATES HAS NEVER DENOUNCED
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AN AGREEMENT AND HAS ALWAYS LIVED UP TO ITS END OF A BILATERAL
AGREEMENT-
AT LEAST AS IMPORTANT, THE U.S. HAS NEVER THREATENED TO
RETALIATE AGAINST THOSE WHO FIND ITS AVIATION POLICIES DIFFICULT
TO ACCEPT BY CHANGING POLICIES IN NONAVIATION AREAS. THOSE
COUNTRIES THAT ENTER INTO LIBERAL AGREEMENTS ARE NOT UNDER ANY
THREATS OR COMPULSION -- THEY ARE ATTRACTED BY THE EXPANDED
OPPORTUNITIES OFFERED TO THEM AND THEY SEE BENEFIT TO THEIR
CITIZENS AND THEIR AIRLINES FROM SUCH AGREEMENTS.
MANY COUNTRIES ALSO SEEM TO HAVE THE MISTAKEN IMPRESSION
THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS A SINGLE "ALL OR NOTHING" APPROACH
TO COMPETITIVE BILATERALS- WE HAVE, HOWEVER, ALWAYS RECOGNIZED
THAT AN AGREEMENT THAT MAKES SENSE WITH GERMANY WILL NOT BE
DIRECTLY TRANSFERABLE TO LESS INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES LIKE
JAMAICA. INDEED, THE PRESIDENT'S 1978 POLICY STATEMENT STATED:
"OUD DI T FRV N EOTI ATTING CIVIL AT
Wul S WL I % I FO ILEG3 A~ f- L 11%1 LTLL -g
TRANSPORT AGREEMENTS REFLECTS OUR
NATIONAL GOALS IN INTERNATIONAL AIR
TRANSPORTATION. THIS POLICY PROVIDES
A SET OF GENERAL OBJECTIVES, DESIGNED
PARTICULARLY FOR MAJOR INTERNATIONAL
AIR MARKETS, ON THE BASIS OF WHICH
UNITED STATES NEGOTIATORS CAN DEVELOP
SPECIFIC NEGOTIATING STRATEGIES-"
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IT, THEREFORE, IS REALLY A MYTH TO SAY THAT DEREGULA-
TION IS NOT ACCEPTABLE INTERNATIONALLY. THE CLAIM IS LITTLE
MORE THAN A PLOY INTENDED TO OBSCURE THE REAL ECONOMIC ISSUES.
SECOND MYTH: "THAT DEREGULATION QUICKLY WILL LEAD TO THE
LOSS OF THE REGULAR HIGH-FREQUENCY SERVICE THAT IS REQUIRED
BY THE WORLD BUSINESS COMMUNITY-"
THOSE WHO SUPPORT A STATUS QUO PHILOSOPHY OFTEN OPPOSE CHANGE
BY PREDICTING THAT WORLD ORDER WILL END IF CHANGE IS ALLOWED-
BETWEEN 1974 AND 1977, DELTA AIRLINES WAS AN ACTIVE ADVOCATE
OF THIS THEORY IN THE U-S. DOMESTIC DEREGULATION DEBATE. IN
1978, IN AN ENVIRONMENT OF FARE FLEXIBILITY AND MULTIPLE ENTRY,
DELTA HAD RECORD EARNINGS ON RECORD REVENUES OF $2.24 BILLION.
TODAY, EVEN WITH THE RAPID ESCALATION IN FUEL COST AND A
DOMESTIC RECESSION WHICH HAS LED TO A DROP IN TRAFFIC, DELTA
IS EXPANDING INTO NEW MARKETS, REMAINS PROFITABLE AND
CONTENDS THAT THE BOARD REGULATES TOO MUCH. THERE IS ABSO-
LUTELY NO EVIDENCE AT ALL TO SUPPORT THE ALLEGATION THAT
SCHEDULED AIR SERVICE THAT IS USEFUL FOR BUSINESS TRAVEL WILL
DISAPPEAR. INDEED, SINCE DEREGULATION, A NUMBER OF CARRIERS
HAVE INSTITUTED THREE CLASS SERVICE WITH A FARE AND SERVICE
PACKAGE SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED FOR BUSINESS TRAVELERS SANDWICHED
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BETWEEN FIRST CLASS AND NORMAL ECONOMY CLASS.
FROM THE CONSUMER'S PERSPECTIVE, THE STATUS QUO
ARGUMENTS ARE PERHAPS THE MOST COUNTERPRODUCTIVE- PERVADING
THESE ARGUMENTS IS THE NOTION THAT THE INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANS-
PORTATION SYSTEM AS IT STANDS CANNOT BE IMPROVED UPON TO ANY
SIGNIFICANT DEGREE, SO NEW SERVICE THAT MIGHT IN THE SLIGHTEST
WAY RESTRUCTURE THIS SYSTEM IS BAD FOR TRAVELERS AS WEL. AS FOR
AIRLINES. THIS APPROACH WOULD HAVE THE WORLD MAINTAIN THE
STATUS QUO EVEN AT THE EXPENSE OF PREVENTING NEW SERVICE
OFFERINGS THAT CONSUMERS MIGHT PREFER -- INDEED BECAUSE
CONSUMERS MIGHT PREFER THEM. THE ADVANTAGE TO CONSUMERS
FROM COMPETITION IS DEMONSTRATED OVER THE NORTH ATLANTIC
WHERE 45 CARRIERS NOW OFFER ABOUT 130 FARES FROM A VARIETY
OF GATEWAYS- QUALITY AND PRICE OPTI-ONS ARE AVAILABLE TO
MEET THE NEEDS OF VIRTUALLY EVERY TRAVELER- WE HOPE THAT
THESE BENEFITS WILL SPREAD TO OTHER INTERNATIONAL MARKETS-
OPPONENTS ARGUE THAT HIGH-FREQUENCY HIGH-CONVENIENCE
WORLDWIDE SERVICES ARE ONLY POSSIBLE WHEN THERE HAS BEEN
INTIMATE DETAILED COOPERATION AND COORDINATION AMONG AIRLINES.
THE UNITED STATES HAS NEVER ADVOCATED THE ABOLISHMENT OF
INTERLINING OR JOINT TICKETING OR BAGGAGE FACILITATION AGREE-
MENTS OR ANY OF THE MYRIAD OTHER LEGITIMATE JOINT ENDEAVORS
THAT MUST BE UNDERTAKEN TO PRESERVE A FUNCTIONING AIR TRANSPORT
SYSTEM- IATA HAS DONE A FINE JOB OF RESOLVING MANY OF THOSE
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COMPLICATED PROBLEMS AND THE UNITED STATES HAS NO DESIRE
OR INTEREST IN DISRUPTING THESE ACTIVITIES-
BUT THE UNITED STATES DOES QUESTION THE PRESUMPTION
THAT CARRIER AGREEMENTS ON PRICE, STRICTLY CONTROLLED
CAPACITY AND PROHIBITIONS AGAINST NEW ENTRY IN AIRLINES ARE
A UNIFORM AND UNIVERSAL NECESSITY TO PRESERVE A WORKING INTER-
NATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT SYSTEM. ALL THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT
THESE RESTRAINTS ARE ONLY NOT REQUIRED BUT ARE UNDESIRABLE-
IN A COMPETITIVE MARKET, SUCH AS THE NORTH ATLANTIC, THE
COMPETITORS CAN CHOOSE THE TYPE OF SERVICE OR SERVICES THEY
WISH TO OFFER AS THEY DO TODAY IN OUR DOMESTIC SYSTEM AND AS
IN MOST OTHER INDUSTRIES AND STILL MAKE A PROFIT- WE ARE CON-
VINCED THAT IN VIRTUALLY ANY MARKET, SERVICE TO THE PUBLIC CAN
BE ENHANCED BY EXPANDING COMPETITIVE OPPORTUNITIES.
THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES STRONGLY THAT AIR TRAVEL
SHOULD NOT BE THE PREROGATIVE ONLY OF BUSINESS TRAVELERS AND
THE VERY RICH. GIVEN TODAY'S AVIATION TECHNOLOGY, THERE IS
NO QUESTION THAT A MUCH GREATER RANGE OF SERVICE CAN BE MADE
AVAILABLE TO THOSE OF US WHO ARE NOT IN EITHER OF THESE EXCLUSIVE
CATEGORIES- IN THE LONG RUN, COMPETITION IS THE SIMPLEST AND
MOST EFFICIENT WAY TO INSURE THE PROPER MIX OF SERVICE.
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THE MERE SUGGESTION THAT THE CURRENT SYSTEM MUST BE
PRESERVED FOR THE BUSINESS TRAVELER BY DENYING SERVICE TO
OTHERS WHO WANT IT AND WHO COULD EASILY AFFORD IT IN A LESS
RESTRICTIVE REGIME RAISES A MUCH MORE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION ABOUT
THE EXTENT TO WHICH GOVERNMENTS SHOULD INTERFERE WITH THE
PRIVATE DECISIONMAKING PROCESS- IS SOCIETY PREPARED TO
ORDAIN THAT BUSINESS TRAVEL IS MORE IMPORTANT TO THE WELL-BEING
OF MANKIND THAN LEISURE TRAVEL? TOURISM IS AN IMPORTANT AND
RAPIDLY GROWING INDUSTRY AND THE DESIRE FOR INTERNATIONAL
TRAVEL IS FELT BY CONSUMERS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. INDEED, A
RECENTLY COMPLETED IATA STUDY INDICATED THAT IN 1979 LESS
THAN 21 PERCENT OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TRAFFIC WAS BUSINESS
TRAVEL-* IT IS ESTIMATED THAT OVER SIX AND A HALF MILLION
OVERSEAS VISITORS WILL TRAVEL TO THE UNITED STATES THIS
YEAR AND EQUAL OR GREATER NUMBERS OF TRAVELERS WILL BE
GOING FROM THE UNITED STATES TO OTHER COUNTRIES. THE
DESIRE FO R PrL E AS U R E -r R AVEL I S A F0RCE T BE RECK0NED ITH-
WE FEEL THAT UPON REFLECTION A CAPACITY CONTROLLED
INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT SYSTEM GEARED PRIMARILY TO THE
NEEDS OF BUSINESS TRAVELERS WOULD APPEAR TO BE UNACCEPTABLE
TO MOST DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS -- WHO, AFTER ALL, ARE
ULTIMATELY SUBJECT TO PUBLIC REVIEW OF THEIR ACTIONS; TO
INNOVATIVE SECOND GENERATION AIRLINES THAT DESIRE TO
EXPAND; AND FINALLY, TO MOST OF THOSE BUSINESS TRAVELERS
* BASED ON AN INFLIGHT SURVEY OF 22,000 PASSENGERS-
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WHO EITHER DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY ARE DEPENDENT ON CONSUMERS
FOR THEIR PROFITS-
THERE ALSO IS A 'SERIOUS QUESTION OF WHETHER BUSINESSES
DURING THIS PERIOD OF RISING COSTS WILL CONTINUE TO RELY ON
EXTENSIVE PERSONAL CONTACT. DOING BUSINESS IN PERSON IS
PROBABLY FAVORED BY MOST PROFESSIONALS. BUT TELECOMMUNICA-
TIONS IS AN IMPORTANT SUBSTITUTE FOR PERSONAL CONTACT AND
HAS A HIGH CROSS-ELASTICITY WITH AIR TRAVEL- WITH PROFITS
FALLING AND COSTS RISING, CORPORATIONS ARE QUESTIONING THEIR
TRAVEL BUDGETS AND LOOKING AT ALTERNATIVES. FOR EXAMPLE,
LARGE MEETINGS CAN NOW BE CONDUCTED BETWEEN AND AMONG 12 U.S.
CITIES OVER AT&T's PICTUREPHONE SYSTEM. WITH THIS SYSTEM YOU
CAN DO VIRTUALLY ANYTHING YOU CAN DO IN A DIRECT MEETING
INCLUDING THE EXCHANGE OF DOCUMENTS. AND A ONE HOUR CALL
BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND Los ANGELES COSTS LESS THAN A SINGLE
PASSENGER'S AIRFARE IN THIS MARKET- WHILE A VIDEO-PHONE SYSTEM
WILL NOT DISPLACE BUSINESS TRAVEL IT IS BUT ONE EXAMPLE OF
VARIOUS INNOVATIVE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS THAT CAN CUT SIGNIFI-
CANTLY INTO THE BUSINESS TRAVEL MARKET- PRIVATE TELECOMMUNI-
CATIONS IS BECOMING A HIGHLY COMPETITIVE INDUSTRY AS COMPANIES
LIKE AT&T, XEROX, IBM AND EXXON SEEK TO ATTRACT NEW BUSINESS
CUSTOMERS FOR THEIR SERVICES. THESE ELECTRONIC COMUNICATIONS
SYSTEMS DO NOT HAVE TO STOP AT FOREIGN BORDERS, AND ARE NOT
HINDERED BY NAVIGATION AND LANDING FEES-
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CERTAINLY, BUSINESS TRAVEL IS NOT ABOUT TO DISAPPEAR --
AND SHOULD CONTINE TO GROW. BUT WILL IT GROW AS RAPIDLY AS
IN THE PAST? WILL THAT HIGH FREQUENCY EASY-ACCESS SYSTEM
BE AS IMPORTANT IN 1990 AS MANY ALLEGE IT IS TODAY? DOES
THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY REALLY NEED INSTANT DIRECT ACCESS
YEAR ROUND IN VIRTUALLY EVERY MARKET? PERHAPS THE GREATEST
THREAT OVER THE NEXT DECADE TO THE COZY WORLD OF INTERNATIONAL
AVIATION IS NOT THE U.S- GOVERNMENT, BUT RATHER THE INDUSTRY
COST STRUCTURE WHEN MEASURED AGAINST THE COSTS OF OTHER
INDUSTRIES WHICH ARE NOW BENEFITTING FROM COST SAVING TECHNO-
LOGICAL INNOVATIONS.
THIS DISCUSSION LEADS DIRECTLY TO THE NEXT MYTH THAT
DEREGULATION IS INCONSISTENT WITH FUEL CONSERVATION. A SYSTEM
SYSTEM DESIGNED ONLY TO PROVIDE INSTANT ACCESS TO HIGH-FREQUENCY
HIGH-CONVENIENCE AIR TRAVEL IS A SYSTEM THAT REQUIRES ONLY
MODERATE LOAD FACTORS WHICH IN TURN COMPELS THE LEAST FUEL
EFFICIENT USE OF THE AIRCRAFT. BUT THERE IS NO REASON WHY
BUSINESS TRAVELERS CANNOT HAVE INSTANT ACCESS TO AS MUCH OF
THE AIRCRAFT AS THEY NEED (AT PRICES THAT REFLECT POTENTIAL SEAT
WASTE), WHILE THE REST OF THE AIRCRAFT IS FILLED WITH PASSENGERS
WILLING TO ACCEPT LOWER SEAT ACCESS FOR LOWER PRICES- INDEED,
MANY AIRLINES ARE OFFERING THIS SERVICE MIX ALREADY IN BOTH
REGULATED AND LESS REGULATED MARKET ENVIRONMENTS-
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THIRD MYTH: "THAT OPEN COMPETITION IS INCONSISTENT WITH
SOUND ENERGY POLICY WHICH MAY REQUIRE SEVERE RESTRICTIONS
ON LEISURE TRAVEL TO ASSURE MAINTAINING SERVICE FOR '
BUSINESS TRAVELERS- i
THE CONSERVATION OF SCARCE RESOURCES IS A SUBJECT OF
IMMENSE CONCERN TO MOST SOCIETIES AROUND THE WORLD. BUT
JUST WHAT IS CONSERVATION? ONE GENERALLY ACCEPTED MEANING
OF THIS TERM IS PHYSICAL EFFICIENCY -- GETTING THE MAXIMUM
OUTPUT FROM A UNIT OF INPUT. AS WILL BE DISCUSSED IN A
MOMENT, OUR STUDIES INDICATE THAT COMPETITION WILL GENERATE
THE MOST ENERGY-EFFICIENT SYSTEM. A SECOND MEANING OF
CONSERVATION IS TO MAKE THE MOST ECONOMICAL USE OF OUR
RESOURCES. BY THIS WE MEAN THAT THE BENEFIT FROM THE USE
EXCEEDS THE COST INCLUDING THE DISCOUNTED FUTURE VALUE OF
USING LESS TODAY IN ORDER TO HAVE MORE TOMORROW. OVER THE
YEARS, THE MARKETPLACE HAS PROVEN TO BE THE MOST RELIABLE TOOL
FOR PRODUCING THIS RESULT- IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT
PRESIDENT CARTER HAS ARGUED SO INTENSELY FOR THE DECONTROL --
NOT GREATER CONTROL -- OF OIL PRICES IN THE UNITED STATES.
THERE ARE THOSE WHO CONSTRUE CONSERVATION TO
MEAN NONUSE. SOME INDUSTRY OBSERVERS HAVE ALREADY CONCLUDED
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THAT WE WILL NOT HAVE ENERGY FOR PLEASURE, THAT WE MUST
ABOLISH "FRIVOLOUS WEEKEND FLIGHTS AT $89 TO CALIFORNIA"
AND RESTRICT AND REGULATE CAREFULLY THE NUMBER OF SEATS TO
BE OFFERED TO THE PUBLIC-* SUCH A DEFEATIST ATTITUDE IS
BOTH UNWISE AND UNCALLED FOR- WHILE AIRLINES WOULD BE
FORCED TO CUT BACK SERVICE -- LEAVING MILLIONS OF DISAPPOINTED
TRAVELERS -- OTHER SECTORS OF THE WORLD ECONOMY WOULD BE
CONTINUING TO BURN OIL FOR PURPOSES MANY OF WHICH MAY BE
LESS SOCIALLY DESIRABLE THAN AIR TRAVEL FOR PLEASURE.- IN
A COMPETITIVE SYSTEM, THE AIRLINES NOT ONLY VIE AGAINST
EACH OTHER FOR TRAVELERS BUT THEY COMPETE AS WELL AGAINST
OTHER GOODS AND SERVICES FOR THE CONSUMER'S DOLLAR. As
RISING COSTS OF FUEL FORCE THE COST OF AIR TRANSPORTATION
UP, CONSUMERS WILL DECIDE WHAT USE OF THAT LIMITED
RESOURCE GIVES THEM THE GREATEST SATISFACTION. THIS WILL
FORCE CARRIERS TO MAKE HARD DECISIONS ABOUT INTERNATIONAL
ROUTES. FOR EXAMPLE, SOME AIRLINES MAINTAIN YEAR-ROUND DAILY
SERVICE IN LONG-HAUL MARKETS THAT PEAK IN THE SUMMER. RISING
FUEL COSTS MIGHT SUGGEST THAT WINTER SERVICE SHOULD BE LESS
FREQUENT OR PROVIDED VIA A STRONG INTERMEDIATE POINT EITHER
* MALDUTIS, THE AIRLINES: DEREGULATION AND FUEL CONSUMPTION
(SALOMON BROTHERS, JULY 12, 1979).
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ONLINE OR ON AN INTERLINE BASIS-
AIR TRANSPORTATION ACCOUNTS FOR ONLY 3.5 PERCENT OF
TOTAL U-S- ENERGY CONSUMPTION AND ABOUT 7 PERCENT OF FUEL
CONSUMED FOR TRANSPORTATION- THE INTERNATIONAL FIGURES
PROBABLY ARE SIMILAR. THIS IS AN EXTREMELY SMALL PERCENT
OF FOSSIL FUEL CONSUMPTION AND WOULD REMAIN SO EVEN IF THE
WORLD EXPERIENCES A 2- OR 3-FOLD INCREASE IN AIR TRAVEL
OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS- IF THE MARKET IS ALLOWED TO OPERATE,
THE AIRLINES CAN BID NEEDED INCREASES IN FUEL AWAY FROM
OTHER ENERGY USERS WHO CAN SWITCH TO OTHER SOURCES LIKE
COAL OR GAS- SUCH AN OUTCOME BENEFITS US ALL. A SYSTEM
OF RESTRICTIONS AND CONTROLS WILL LEAD TO A DISAPPOINTED PUBLIC,
A STAGNATING INDUSTRY AND MISALLOCATION OF RESOURCES.
FOURTH MYTH: "THAT COMPETITION MAY LOOK GOOD DURING THE BOOM
IN THE BUSINESS CYCLE BUT HISTORY HAS SHOWN THAT EXCESSIVE
DISCOUNT PRICING DURING GROWTH PERIODS HAS LED TO OVERCAPACITY
AND FINANCIAL DISASTER DURING THE DOWNTURNS-
THE ARGUMENT THAT AIRLINES MUST BE REGULATED BECAUSE
THEY MAY LOSE MONEY DURING A RECESSION IS PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT
TO UNDERSTAND. ALL INDUSTRIES ARE SUBJECT TO THE IMPACT OF
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BUSINESS DOWNTURNS WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE REGULATED. IN
GENERAL, OVER THESE CYCLES, THE AVERAGE FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE
FOR U.S. AIRLINES, WITH A FEW NOTABLE EXCEPTIONS, HAS BEEN IN
THE RANGE OF A 6 TO 8 PERCENT ROI WHICH IS BELOW THE AVERAGE
FOR MOST UNREGULATED INDUSTRIES OF SIMILAR SIZE. BASED ON
THE EVIDENCE AVAILABLE TO US, WE HAVE NOT SEEN THAT FOREIGN
CARRIERS HAVE FARED MUCH BETTER DESPITE TIGHT RATE REGULATION
AND POOLING ARRANGEMENTS- IT'S VERY DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THAT
ANY INDUSTRY BLESSED WITH THE RATE OF GROWTH THAT AVIATION
HAS HAD OVER THE LAST 20 YEARS COULD, IN THE AGGREGATE, DO SO
POORLY. IN A COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT, EACH AIRLINE WILL HAVE
MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY TO DEVELOP A PRICING AND SERVICE SCHEME
TO BEST SEE IT THROUGH A RECESSION.
DURING PAST RECESSIONS, REGULATORS HAVE BEEN GUILTY OF
VERY COUNTERPRODUCTIVE BEHAVIOR -- ENCOURAGING THE AIRLINES
TO RAISE PRICES AT A TIME WHEN TRAFFIC WAS FALLING. LEFT TO
THEIR OWN DEVICES, THE INDUSTRY COULD NOT HAVE DONE MUCH
WORSE AND MIGHT HAVE DONE SUBSTANTIALLY BETTER-
A NUMBER OF OUR CRITICS HAVE POINTED OUT THAT THE U-S.
HAS BEEN FAR FROM CONSISTENT, OVER THE YEARS, IN OUR ADVOCACY
OF COMPETITION- THEY SUGGEST THAT OUR DEVOTION TO THE PRINCIPLE
OF COMPETITION WILL WANE RAPIDLY IF BAD TIMES LEAD TO LOSSES.
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THIS SEEMS UNLIKELY. WE HAVE COME TO REALIZE THAT
RESTRICTIVE POLICIES DO NOT HELP AND PERHAPS HINDER ECONOMIC
RECOVERY- INDEED, IN THE LAST MAJOR RECESSION, THE LESS
REGULATED SECTORS OF THE INDUSTRY DID MUCH BETTER THAN THE MORE
REGULATED CARRIERS. FOR EXAMPLE, A NEW ENTRANT, SOUTHWEST
AIRLINES, WAS MAKING A LOT OF MONEY IN AN UNREGULATED ENVIRON-
MENT THROUGHOUT THE STATE OF TEXAS BY OFFERING A LOW FARE
SERVICE FROM A NUMBER OF CITIES TO HOUSTON AND DALLAS. ANOTHER
EXAMPLE IS THE BOARD'S TREATMENT OF MAINLAND - HAWAII SERVICE-
IN 1969, THE BOARD INCREASED THE NUMBER OF AIRLINES SERVING
HAWAII FROM 3 TO 8. IT AUTHORIZED DIRECT SERVICE FROM 21
ADDITIONAL POINTS AND CREATED SUBSTANTIAL NEW COMPETITION.
DESPITE THE WORLDWIDE DOWNTURN IN TRAFFIC, ON THESE ROUTES
FARES WENT DOWN, SERVICE IMPROVED, TRAFFIC GREW AND ALL THE
UNRESTRICTED CARRIERS DID QUITE WELL. FINALLY, EVEN DURING
THE LAST RECESSION WE MADE IT CLEAR TO PAN AMERICAN AND
TWA THAT WE WERE NOT GOING TO BAIL THEM OUT OF THEIR
FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES AND BOTH CARRIERS WERE FORCED TO TAKE
DRASTIC STEPS TO STAY ALIVE. TODAY, THE INDUSTRY IS AGAIN
GOING INTO A DIFFICULT PERIOD. BECAUSE OF THE GENERAL EASE
OF ENTRY, THE BOARD'S POLICY IS TO GRANT GREATER PRICING
FLEXIBILITY TO THE CARRIERS SO THAT THEY CAN DETERMINE A
PRICING POLICY TO MINIMIZE LOSSES. THE CARRIERS ARE NOW
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LOOKING FOR THE RIGHT PRICING STRATEGY TO SEE THEM
THROUGH THIS DIFFICULT PERIOD. THERE WERE NO SIMPLE
ANSWERS UNDER REGULATION AND THERE ARE NONE NOW. HOWEVER,
EACH CARRIER HAS MUCH GREATER LATITUDE TO EXPERIMENT.
THE LOW FARE SPECIALISTS LIKE SOUTHWEST, AIR FLORIDA AND
MIDWAY AIRLINES ARE DOING WELL AND THEIR TRAFFIC CONTINUES
TO GROW EVEN THROUGH THE RECESSION-
ONE OF THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST INTERNATIONAL DEREGULATION
IS THAT NO GOVERNMENT WOULD ALLOW ITS NATIONAL AIRLINES TO GO
BANKRUPT; AND IF IT SUBSIDIZED THE CARRIER, THE UNITED
STATES WOULD ALLEGE UNFAIR COMPETITION. THE UNITED STATES
UNDERSTANDS AND ACCEPTS THAT VERY FEW, IF ANY, COUNTRIES
WOULD SUFFER THE LOSS OF THEIR FLAG CARRIERS AND THAT
SUBSIDIES MIGHT BE PAID TO KEEP THEM AFLOAT DURING A RECESSION.
BUT A SUBSIDY PAID TO KEEP A NATIONAL CARRIER OUT OF BANK-
RUPTCY IS FAR DIFFERENT FROM A SUBSIDY DESIGNED TO DRIVEA
COMPETITOR FROM THE MARKET- I DOUBT THAT ANY GOVERNMENT
WOULD BE INCLINED TO BEAR THE COSTS OF SUCH AN ATTEMPT.
BUT EVEN THE MOST LIBERAL BILATERALS HAVE PROVISIONS TO GUARD
AGAINST THIS SORT OF PREDATORY PRICING BEHAVIOR-
ACTUALLY, IT WOULD BE MUCH MORE EFFICIENT AND EQUITABLE
TO PROVIDE DIRECT SUBSIDIES FROM GOVERNMENTS TO ALLOW THEIR
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NATIONAL CARRIERS TO PURSUE NON-ECONOMIC BUT SOCIALLY
DESIRABLE OBJECTIVES, THAN TO HAVE CONSUMERS SUPPORT AN
INEFFICIENT COMPETITOR THROUGH HIGHER FARES. DIRECT SUB-
SIDIES SERVE TWO VALUABLE ROLES. FIRST, THEY CLARIFY
NATIONAL PRIORITIES SUCH AS MAINTAINING A GOVERNMENT OWNED
AIRLINE OR MAINTAINING EMPLOYMENT OR MAINTAINING A NATIONAL
AIRFRAME INDUSTRY OR WHATEVER AND PAY THE COST OF THAT
PRIORITY UP FRONT OUT OF TAX DOLLARS-* SECOND, A DIRECT
SUBSIDY HELPS TO KEEP MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTABLE TO THE STOCK-
HOLDERS, BE THEY PUBLIC OR PRIVATE- IF THE CARRIER CANNOT
EARN A RETURN AT THE MARKET FARE LEVEL, THE PUBLIC HAS A
VISIBLE MEASURE OF ITS INEFFICIENCY. WHEN EXCESSIVE COSTS
ARE HIDDEN BY EXCESSIVE FARES, BOTH THE PUBLIC AND THE
STOCKHOLDERS LOSE-
THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS PERFECT COMPETITION BUT NEITHER
IS THERE PERFECT REGULATION. LEFT TO THEIR OWN DEVICES,
AIRLINE MANAGEMENTS CAN MAKE DECISIONS AS WELL AS ANY OTHER
CORPORATE MANAGEMENTS. THEY CAN DO JUST AS WELL, IF NOT BETTER,
OVER THE BUSINESS CYCLE WITHOUT REGULATION AS THEY CAN WITH IT;
AND THIS IS REASON ENOUGH NOT TO INTERVENE-
* THIS IS EXACTLY THE REASON FOR THE SUBSIDY PROGRAM SET UP
TO SUPPORT ESSENTIAL AIR SERVICE TO SMALL COMMUNITIES IN
THE UNITED STATES-
- 24 -
FIFTH MYTH: "THAT CAREFUL REGULATION AND CAPACITY CONTROL
CAN ACHIEVE LOWER FARES THAN CAN OPEN ENTRY AND COMPETITION-"
LOW FARES ARE NOT A SPECIFIC GOAL OF U-- POLICY-
RATHER, THEY ARE ONE OF THE INHERENT BYPRODUCTS OF COMPETITION-
COMPETITION SHOULD GENERATE A RANGE OF CHOICES AT A VARIETY
OF PRICES. THUS, DURING 1979 FOR EXAMPLE, BETWEEN NEW YORK
AND FRANKFURT AND AMSTERDAM, THERE WERE A NUMBER OF AIRLINES
OFFERING A WHOLE RANGE OF FARES DOWN TO WIDELY AVAILABLE
DISCOUNT FARES OF ABOUT 4.8 CENTS PER PASSENGER MILE. DURING
THAT YEAR THESE REDUCTIONS, ADJUSTED FOR INFLATION, SHOW THAT
CONSUMERS USING THOSE DISCOUNT FARES SAVED ALMOST $9 MILLION
OVER WHAT THEY WOULD HAVE PAID A YEAR AGO FOR A SIMILAR TRIP
BETWEEN NEW YORK AND FRANKFURT OR AMSTERDAM.
LOW FARES ALSO CAN BE HAD THROUGH REGULATION. BUT AT
WHAT COST? LAST SUMMER ONE COULD BUY A SUPER APEX FLIGHT
BETWEEN SYDNEY AND LONDON WITH A LOW FARE-PER-MILE RANGING
FROM 5.2 DOWN TO 3.1 CENTS DEPENDING ON THE SEASON- UNFOR-
TUNATELY, THE GOVERNMENTS HAVE DETERMINED THAT THIS FARE CAN
ONLY BE OFFERED BY QANTAS OR BRITISH AIRWAYS WITHOUT THE
POSSIBILITY OF STOPOVERS OR INTERLINE CONNECTIONS- IN THIS
CASE, LOW FARES ARE ACHIEVED NOT BY PROMOTING EFFICIENCY
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THROUGH COMPETITION BUT BY EXCLUDING EFFICIENT OPERATORS
FROM THE MARKET AND THEREBY ASSURING EXTREMELY HIGHLOAD
FACTORS. THIS APPROACH MAY JEOPARDIZE THE VERY INTERNATIONAL
NETWORK THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SO VIGOROUSLY
DEFENDS. EXCLUSION OF THIRD NATION CARRIERS FROM COMPETING
INVITES RETALIATION AND PROTECTIONISM. RESTRICTIONS OF THE
NUMBER OF SEATS AVAILABLE AT LOW FARES BENEFITS THE LUCKY FEW
AT THE EXPENSE OF THE MANY WHO ARE NOT OFFERED THE SAME CHOICE-
IMPOSITION OF ARTIFICIALLY HIGH PRICES ON THOSE WHOSE NEEDS
GO BEYOND BASIC, ADVANCE-PURCHASE, POINT-TO-POINT AIR TRAVEL,
DAMAGES THE INTERNATIONAL NETWORK AND THOSE WHO USE IT- AND
IN THE END, IN THE LONG RUN, EVEN THE ARTIFICIALLY FAVORED
LOW FARE CONSUMERS WILL PROBABLY BE HURT AS COSTS --
UNCHECKED BY THE MARKETPLACE -- FORCE FARES TO RISE MORE
RAPIDLY THAN THEY WOULD IN A COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT-
SIXTH MYTH: "THAT IT IS FOOLISH TO TALK ABOUT OPEN SKIES
WHEN THE INDUSTRY IS SO DEPENDENT ON EXTERNAL CONSTRAINTS
SUCH AS LIMITED AIRPORT CAPACITY, AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL,
TOURIST ORGANIZATIONS, ETC-"
"WE CAN'T DEREGULATE EVEN IF WE WANTED TO," IS THE
PREMISE OF THIS MYTH- ITS ADVOCATES ARGUE THAT AIRPORT
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CONGESTION, AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS AND ENVIRONMENTALISTS
JUST WOULD PREVENT AN OPEN SKIES POLICY FROM WORKING. THIS
ARGUMENT CAN NOT WITHSTAND CLOSE ANALYSIS- IN THE FIRST
PLACE, MOST OF THE POTENTIAL COMPETITORS ARE ALREADY
FLYING TO ALL THOSE AIRPORTS ANYWAY; ONLY NOW THEY MUST
OPERATE UNDER VARIOUS HANDICAPS IMPOSED BY RESTRICTIVE
BILATERALS- SECOND, WE HAVE FOUND IN THE UNITED STATES THAT
MOST AIRPORT OPERATORS WILL BEND OVER BACKWARDS TO GET SPACE
FOR A NEW ENTRANT OR FOR AN INCUMBENT THAT WANTS TO EXPAND.
NEW SERVICE MEANS MORE BUSINESS FOR THEM AND FOR THEIR
COMMUNITIES- GROUND CONGESTION, WHILE A PROBLEM, CAN BE
MODERATED BY SCHEDULING NEW FLIGHTS AT OFF-PEAKS (AND PRICING
THEM TO ATTRACT TRAFFIC) AND, WHERE AVAILABLE, BY INCREASING
SERVICE TO SATELLITE AIRPORTS (AGAIN, REFLECTING THE LOWER
COSTS OF UNCONGESTED OPERATIONS IN FARES THAT WILL ATTRACT
TRAFFIC TO THEM)- CONGESTION IS NOT A NEW PROBLEM AND
SOLUTIONS MUST BE FOUND REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THERE IS GREATER
COMPETITION. FINALLY, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE FOUR AIRPORTS IN THE
UNITED STATES THAT ARE SUBJECT TO LANDING SLOT RESTRICTIONS,
NEW AIRLINES HAVE BEEN ABLE TO INITIATE SERVICE AT ALL OF
THEM-
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THE PROSPECT FOR THE 80's
COMPETITION LEADS TO MANY POSITIVE RESULTS: GREATER
EFFICIENCY AND INNOVATION, A GREATER VARIETY OF SERVICE
FOR CONSUMERS, GREATER PROFIT OPPORTUNITIES TO AIRLINES
AND TO A PROPER ALLOCATION OF SCARCE ENERGY RESOURCES-
ALL THESE BENEFITS SUGGEST THAT GOVERNMENTS SHOULD
SUPPORT THE EXPANSION OF COMPETITIVE MARKETS IN THE 1980's.
WHETHER THEY WILL, HOWEVER, IS NOT SO CLEAR. GENERAL
MARKET ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES STATE THAT WHEN FIRMS ARE ABLE
TO FREELY ENTER AND EXIT A MARKET, THE PRICE, QUALITY AND
AND QUANTITY OF THE PARTICULAR PRODUCT PRODUCED WILL BE
SET BY THE INTERACTION OF BUYERS AND SELLERS. EFFICIENT
SELLERS ARE THOSE THAT CAN EARN A PROFIT AT THE MARKET PRICE-
INEFFICIENT SELLERS LEAVE THE MARKET EITHER VOLUNTARILY OR VIA
BANKRUPTCY- l'ANY OF THE WORLD'S AVIATION LEADERS HAVE
GENERATED A COMPENDIUM OF ALL THE REASONS AND THEORIES WHICH
EXPLAIN WHY MARKET ECONOMICS CAN NOT WORK OR IS NOT WORKING
IN THIS INDUSTRY. THESE ARGUMENTS HAVE LITTLE OR NOTHING TO DO
WITH THE MARKETPLACE OR EFFICIENT PRODUCTION. THOUGH OFTEN
COUCHED IN ECONOMIC TERMINOLOGY, THEY ARE INTENDED PRIMARILY
TO PROTECT VARIOUS SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS-
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WHETHER THE NUMBER OF COMPETITIVE MARKETS GROWS OR
CONTRACTS SIGNIFICANTLY OVER THE NEXT DECADE WILL DEPEND
LARGELY ON THE WILLINGNESS OF POLICYMAKERS AROUND THE
WORLD TO REJECT THE CONSTRAINTS THAT FLOW FROM PROTECTIONIST
ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF THE MORE OPEN REGIME FAVORED BY
MARKET ECONOMICS- IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT A MARKET
SYSTEM WILL SUPPLANT THE CURRENT HODGEPODGE OVER THE NEXT
DECADE- SOME IMPORTANT INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES SUCH
AS JAPAN, AUSTRALIA AND ITALY APPEAR TO BE STAUNCHLY OPPOSED
TO GREATER COMPETITION AS ARE MANY DEVELOPING NATIONS. BUT,
IN THE LONG RUN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A BROAD BASED FREE TRADE
ZONE IN AIR TRANSPORTATION, AS IN MOST OTHER INDUSTRIES, WILL
BE CRUCIAL TO THE CONTINUED IMPROVEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
AIR TRANSPORT NETWORK.
FOR LESSER DEVELOPED COUNTRIES THE ROAD AHEAD IS ESPECIALLY
DIFFICULT AND TO MAKE A GOVERNMENTAL COMMITMENT TO GREATER
COMPETITION IS EQUALLY DIFFICULT. THE ABUNDANCE OF
CONSUMER GOODS AVAILABLE IN MOST INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES
IS APPEALING TO PEOPLES OF MOST NATIONS. AND, THE COMMINGLING
OF SOCIETIES MADE POSSIBLE BY TODAY'S AIR TRANSPORT AND
COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS HAVE SURELY CONTRIBUTED TO THESE
COUNTRIES DESIRES FOR THE BENEFITS OF INDUSTRIALIZATION-
LAST YEAR PHILIP CALDWELL, THE PRESIDENT OF FORD MOTOR
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COMPANY NOTED:
RISING EXPECTATIONS ARE JUST AS EVIDENT
WHEN IT COMES TO GOVERNMENTS- IT HAS
BEEN SAID THAT EVERY EMERGING NATIONAL
WANTS FIRST AND FOREMOST A STEEL MILL AND
NATIONAL JET AIRLINE OF ITS OWN. AT
LAST COUNT THERE ARE NOW AT LEAST 30 NEW
STEELMAKING FACILITIES AND MORE THAN 50
NATIONAL AIRLINES IN COUNTRIES THAT DID NOT
HAVE EITHER AS RECENTLY AS 25 YEARS AGO-*
THE INTRODUCTION OF THESE CAPITAL INTENSIVE INDUSTRIES INTO
LESSER DEVELOPED ECONOMIES IS TODAY OFTEN ACCOMPANIED BY
TARIFFS, QUOTAS AND OTHER TRADE RESTRAINTS DESIGNED TO
PROTECT INFANT DOMESTIC INDUSTRIES- PERHAPS FOR DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES SOME PROTECTIONISM IS A LOGICAL APPROACH TO THEIR
PERCEIVED NEED FOR ECONOMIC SELF-SUFFICIENCY AND GROWTH.
BUT IN GENERAL AND CERTAINLY FOR INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES,
THE IMPOSITION OF MARKET RESTRAINTS IS ULTIMATELY
SELF-DEFEATING AND COSTLY TO CONSUMERS-
*PHILIP CALDWELL, "U.S. BECOMING ECONOMIC COLONY FOR FAILING TO
MEET WORLD CHANGES," FINANCIER, FEBRUARY 1979, P. 21.
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OVER THE LAST TWENTY YEARS THE UNITED STATES HAS
WATCHED, AND, TO A GREAT EXTENT AIDED, THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY
OF A WAR TORN EUROPE AND JAPAN. BY THE END OF THE SEVENTIES --
A DECADE OF DOMESTIC POLITICAL TURMOIL -- MANY U.S.
INDUSTRIES SUDDENLY WOKE UP TO THE REALITY THAT FOREIGN
COMPETITORS CONTROLLED A LARGE SHARE OF THEIR MAJOR DOMESTIC
MARKETS IN SUCH GOODS AS STEEL, AUTOMOBILES, TEXTILES AND
TELEVISIONS. TODAY, COUNTRIES LIKE WEST GERMANY AND JAPAN
ARE SEEING THEIR STRONG POSITIONS BEGINNING TO BE ERODED
BY NEWLY DEVELOPING ECONOMIES IN COUNTRIES LIKE KOREA AND
SINGAPORE-
IN THE ABSENCE OF TRADE BARRIERS, ECONOMISTS SEE
THESE TRENDS AS POSITIVE BECAUSE THEY PROMOTE EFFICIENCY,
SPECIALIZATION AND COMPETITION, ALL OF WHICH BENEFIT
CONSUMERS. BUT AS THE SALES OF IMPORTS RISE, DOMESTIC
PRODUCERS AND LABOR IN AGING INDUSTRIES BECOME CONCERINED
THEY RAISE THE SPECTER OF FOREIGN DOMINANCE OF KEY INDUSTRIES
LIKE STEEL AND TEXTILES -- CONTENDING THAT THE COUNTRY WILL
BECOME VULNERABLE TO EXTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS. GENERALLY THOSE
WHO ARGUE MOST STRONGLY FOR PROTECTION ARE THE AFFECTED
PRODUCERS AND THEIR LABOR FORCES. THUS, WE RECENTLY WITNESSED
THAT VIRTUALLY SIMULTANEOUSLY OUR DOMESTIC STEEL INDUSTRY
CHARGED EUROPEAN STEEL PRODUCERS WITH PREDATORY DUMPING
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WHILE AGREEING TO AN INDUSTRY WIDE LABOR SETTLEMENT
THAT WILL RAISE WAGES APPROXIMATELY THIRTY PERCENT
OVER THREE YEARS-
ARGUMENTS FOR CONTROLLED TRADE ARE SUPERFICIALLY
APPEALING BUT, IF ACCEPTED, ARE ULTIMATELY DETRIMENTAL
TO DOMESTIC CONSUMERS AND THE WORLD ECONOMY- PROTECTIONISM
SHELTERS HIGH COST INEFFICIENT PRODUCERS WHICH LEADS TO
HIGHER PRICES AND REDUCED SUPPLY- QUOTAS -- WHICH
HAVE AN AVIATION COUNTERPART IN RESTRICTED ROUTE RIGHTS,
CAPACITY RESTRAINTS AND POOLING ARRANGEMENTS - ARE MOST
DESTRUCTIVE BECAUSE THEY LIMIT THE CONSUMERS PHYSICAL
ACCESS TO A PRODUCT. NOT ONLY DOES THE PRICE RISE ABOVE THE
COMPETITIVE LEVEL BUT THE QUOTA PREVENTS FUTURE CHANGES
IN RELATIVE COSTS- INCENTIVES FOR EFFICIENCY ARE
ELIMINATED, AND RESOURCES BECOME LOCKED INTO LESS
PRODUCTIVE ACTIVITIES WHICH DELAY THEIR TRANSFER TO MORE
PRODUCTIVE USES- IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD THAT MUST
BECOME MORE EFFICIENT, THE CURRENT TREND TOWARD INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTIONISM BY INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS REPRESENTS A SERIOUS
THREAT TO STABILIZING THE WORLD ECONOMIC ORDER-
OVER THE YEARS THE INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES HAVE BEEN
HEALTHY ADVOCATES OF MARKET CONTROLS. FIRST, ON THE GROUNDS
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THAT AIR TRANSPORT WAS AN INFANT INDUSTRY, THEN BECAUSE
IT WAS A PUBLIC UTILITY AND TODAY BECAUSE THE SYSTEM IS
SO COMPLEX AND BECAUSE IT CONSUMES OIL. ALTHOUGH THE
AIRLINE PEOPLE ADVOCATE A MULTILATERAL APPROACH, IT IS AN
APPROACH THAT TRADITIONALLY HAS BEEN PREMISED UPON PRO-
TECTIONISM. AS DISCUSSED UNDER THE SECOND MYTH, A LARGE
SEGMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL AVIATION COMMUNITY HAS SPENT
A GOOD DEAL OF TIME AND MONEY IN AN EFFORT TO CONVINCE
GOVERNMENTS AND THE PUBLIC AT LARGE THAT THE SYSTEM WILL
COLLAPSE WITHOUT ROUTE RESTRICTIONS, PRICE CONTROLS AND
DETAILED COORDINATION OF RATES. THEY HAVE, WITH SOME
SUCCESS, OBSCURED THE MARKET ECONOMIC REALITIES OF AIR
TRANSPORTATION WITH WHAT APPEAR TO BE LARGELY SELF
GENERATED INTERNATIONAL COMPLEXITIES-
VERY FEW UNITED STATES AIRLINES INITIALLY FAVORED
DOMESTIC AIRLINE DEREGULATION. AND, OUR INTERNATIONAL
OPERATORS WERE AS SURPRISED AS FOREIGN CARRIERS AND THEIR
GOVERNMENTS BY THE U- S. GOVERNMENT'S QUANTUM LEAP TOWARD
A COMPETITIVE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM- YET, THESE PRECIPITOUS
CHANGES HELPED THE U-S. AIRLINES TO BECOME SOME OF THE MOST
EFFICIENT IN THE WORLD AND TODAY THEY ALL FAVOR DEREGULATION-
TO THE EXTENT THAT FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS CONTINUE TO ACCEPT
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THE PROTECTIONIST S ARGUMENTS -- WHICH WERE ACCEPTED
BY THE U-S- GOVERNMENT FOR 40 YEARS -- A SERIOUS
EFFICIENCY GAP BETWEEN U-S. CARRIERS AND MOST FOREIGN
CARRIERS WILL LIKELY DEVELOP. AS THE GAP BETWEEN THE
EFFICIENT AND INEFFICIENT PRODUCER WIDENS, THE PRESSURES
ON GOVERNMENTS TO INCREASE RESTRICTIONS MOUNT. THE
ABILITY TO MAKE ADJUSTMENTS BECOMES MORE DIFFICULT AND
ULTIMATELY THE SOCIAL COSTS TOO HIGH. THE UNITED
STATES IS FACING THIS TEST TODAY IN A NUMBER OF INDUSTRIES-
THE PRESSURES ON THE GOVERNMENT ARE INTENSE AND DESPITE
THE PRESIDENT'S GENERAL COMMITMENT TO FREE TRADE, THE OUTCOME
IS DIFFICULT TO PREDICT-
IF GOVERNMENTS CHOOSE THE PROTECTIONIST ROUTE FOR THEIR
AIRLINES, THE CHANCES FOR A BROADLY BASED COMPETITIVE INTER-
NATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT SYSTEM WILL SURELY DIM- IN THE SHORT
RUN THIS MEANS THAT THE EFFICIENT CARRIERS WILL EARN LARGER
PROFITS AND THE INEFFICIENT WILL CONTINUE TO OPERATE- IN
THE LONGER RUN A RETURN TO PROTECTIONISM -- OR MERELY
FAILURE TO ADD TO THE COMPETITIVE AGREEMENTS THAT NOW
EXIST -- WILL SERIOUSLY HURT THE INDUSTRY AS RISING
PRICES FIRST FORCE THE VACATIONER AND ULTIMATELY THE BUSINESS
COMMUNITY TO CUT BACK ON AIR TRAVEL. THIS IN TURN WILL
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SURELY HURT THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY WHICH IS NOW DEVELOPING
INTO AN INTERNATIONALLY COMPETITIVE INDUSTRY-
TODAY THERE IS COMPETITIVE AIR TRANSPORTATION IN A
NUMBER OF NORTH ATLANTIC MARKETS AND SOME NEW COMPETITIVE
ROUTES FROM THE U-- TO THE PACIFIC AND THE MIDDLE EAST-
THERE ARE A FEW OTHER MODERATELY OPEN AGREEMENTS NOT
INVOLVING THE UNITED STATES. THE ANSWER TO HOW MUCH
COMPETITION TO EXPECT IN THE 1980'S DEPENDS LARGELY ON
THE EXTENT TO WHICH GOVERNMENTS WILL BE WILLING TO MOVE
AWAY -- EVEN IN CAREFULLY MEASURED STEPS -- FROM THE
PROTECTIONIST THINKING THAT HAS DOMINATED AVIATION POLICY
FOR SO MANY YEARS-
ON THIS ISSUE THERE SEEM TO BE DIFFERING TRENDS.
ON THE ONE HAND THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS TAKEN A NUMBER OF
STEPS TO MAKE BRITISH AIRWAYS MORE EFFICIENT AND TO
EXPAND THE MARKET OPPORTUNITIES OF OTHER PRIVATELY OWNED
AIRLINES- WE ALSO KNOW THAT THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES ISSUED A REPORT LAST SUMMER FAVORING THE REMOVAL
OF BARRIERS NOW BLOCKING A MORE COMPETITIVE AIR TRANSPORT
SYSTEM BETWEEN AND AMONG THE COMMON MARKET COUNTRIES. THE
REPORT NOTED SOME OF THE DIFFERING OPERATING CHARACTERISTICS
BETWEEN U-- DOMESTIC SERVICE AND INTRA-EUROPE SERVICE
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WHICH IT CONTENDS ENABLE OUR CARRIERS TO OPERATE MORE
EFFICIENTLY. THE COMMISSION SUGGESTS THAT A MORE
INTEGRATED AND COMPETITIVE NETWORK MIGHT ENABLE EUROPEAN
CARRIERS TO ACHIEVE SOME OF THESE SAME EFFICIENCIES-
ON THE OTHER HAND SOME OF THE GOALS OF THE NEWLY
FORMED INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LATIN AMERICAN AIR
CARRIERS MAY TEND TO HINDER GROWTH OF A COMPETITIVE
EFFICIENT SYSTEM- MANY OF THE GOALS OF A REGIONAL AIRLINE
ORGANIZATION SUCH AS THE SHARING OF TECHNICAL EXPERTISE
AND TRAINING FACILITIES OR THE MAINTENANCE OF A JOINT SPARE
PARTS INVENTORY MAY BE QUITE DESIRABLE. HOWEVER, THE
PRESIDENT OF AEROPERU STATED THAT THE INITIAL POSITION OF
THE ORGANIZATION WILL BE TO PROTECT LATIN AMERICAN
TRAFFIC FOR LATIN AMERICAN CARRIERS BY REDUCING FIFTH AND
SIXTH FREEDOM OPERATIONS BY NON-LATIN AMERICAN CARRIERS.
THIS OBJECTIVE, IF ACCEPTED AS A POLICY GOAL BY THE
MEMBER CARRIERS' GOVERNMENTS, WILL CERTAINLY BE COUNTER-
PRODUCTIVE TO IMPROVING THEIR CARRIERS' EFFICIENCY AND
KEEPING DOWN THE COST TO CONSUMERS-
THERE IS VERY LITTLE UPON WHICH ECONOMISTS SEEM ABLE
TO AGREE. BUT MOST DO AGREE THAT THE BENEFITS OF FREE
TRADE TO INDIVIDUAL NATIONS AND THE WORLD AS AN ECONOMIC
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UNIT FAR OUTWEIGH THE COSTS THAT MAY BE BORNE BY
PARTICULAR SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS AS A CONSEQUENCE
OF THIS POLICY. WE HAVE SEEN ON THE NORTH ATLANTIC
AND IN THE UNITED STATES OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS
THAT COMPETITION CAN GENERATE SUBSTANTIAL CONSUMER
BENEFITS AND TRAFFIC GROWTH. WE HAVE SEEN THAT IN A
COMPETITIVE SYSTEM THE CARRIERS CAN DO EXTREMELY WELL
IN PROSPEROUS YEARS AND CAN SURVIVE THE BAD ONES-
WHEN GOVERNMENTS ACT AS PROPRIETORS IT IS UNDERSTANDABLY
DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO SEPARATE SHORT RUN REVENUE CONCERNS
FROM LONGER TERM GOVERNMENTAL INTERESTS. THE DEGREE OF
COMPETITION THAT DEVELOPS OVER THE NEXT DECADE WILL DEPEND
PRIMARILY ON THE WILLINGNESS OF GOVERNMENTS TO QUESTION
SERIOUSLY THE POLITICAL ECONOMIC ARGUMENTS RAISED BY THEIR
AIRLINES AND TO MAKE TOUGH CHOICES ABOUT THE LONG RUN
TRADE-OFFS BETWEEN CONTINUED PERVASIVE PROTECTIONISM AND
A MORE COMPETITIVELY ORIENTED SYSTEM- MOST COUNTRIES --
INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES -- MUST MAKE THIS CHOICE ABOUT
A NUMBER OF INDUSTRIES. AIRLINES ARE NOT UNIQUE IN THIS
RESPECT. THEY ARE PRIMARILY JUST ANOTHER CONSUMER SERVICE
THAT SHOULD OPERATE IN RESPONSE TO COMMERCIAL REALITIES.
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THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WILL CONTINUE TO URGE
OTHER GOVERNMENTS TO MOVE IN A LIBERALIZING DIRECTION.
NOT SOLELY, AS OFTEN ALLEGED, BECAUSE OUR AIRLINES ARE
STRONG AND WILL DO WELL- SOME ARE NOT STRONG AND WILL
NOT DO WELL. RATHER, THE UNITED STATES IS MOTIVATED BY
THE SUBSTANTIAL CONSUMER BENEFITS THAT WILL ACCRUE TO THE
TRAVELING AND SHIPPING PUBLIC AND TO THE AIRLINE
INDUSTRY FROM A COMPETITIVE SYSTEM. THE DOLLAR VALUE
OF THESE BENEFITS FAR EXCEED THE PROFITS OF THE INDUSTRY-
IN A WORLD OF RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS, AND GROWING INTER-
DEPENDENCE, ENHANCING THE EFFICIENT FLOW OF COMMERCE
THROUGHOUT THE WORLD SHOULD BE A HIGH PRIORITY. THE
UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT IT IS, AND BELIEVES THAT A
MORE COMPETITIVE AIR TRANSPORT SYSTEM IN THE 1980's WILL
CONTRIBUTE TO ACHIEVING THAT GOAL-
THE UNITED STATES WILL BE A FLEXIBLE NEGOTIATOR WITH
COUNTRIES THAT ARE RECALCITRANT PARTNERS IN LIBERALIZATION --
PARTICULARLY WITH THIRD WORLD NATIONS. BUT WE HOPE THAT
THESE COUNTRIES WILL COME FORWARD WITH NEW IDEAS THAT SHOW
SOME MOVEMENT TOWARD AN EXCHANGE OF COMPETITIVE OPPORTUNITIES.
ALSO OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS WE HOPE TO BEGIN WORKING WITH
OUR LIBERAL TRADING PARTNERS ON AGREEMENTS THAT CAN EXTEND
GREATER MUTUAL BENEFITS THAN MAY BE ACHIEVED THROUGH A MORE
TRADITIONAL BILATERAL AGREEMENT-
